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  1Risk and De-Collectivisation: 






A salient feature of the transformation process in post-socialist Central and Eastern European 
countries has been the relative persistence of socialist-era production structures in the agricultural 
sectors. Socialist farms were either collective or state farms. Both farm types had a separation 
between farm ownership, control over the production process and implementation of production 
tasks (they, and their successor organisations, will therefore be referred to as corporate farms). 
These were wage-labour farms, as distinct from the Western-type family farm, which are operated 
by an individual or sa single household (here referred to as individual farms). 
In the agricultural economics literature preceding the liberal revolutions of 1989-1991 in the 
region, socialist agriculture had long been identified as cost-inefficient due to incentive problems 
inherent in the governance structure of wage-labour farms (Pollak, 1985; Schmitt, 1993; IMF et al., 
1991:157-158;  Machness and Schnytzer, 1993:162; Mathijs, 1998:33). In consequence, 
privatisation, or the change in formal ownership titles, was expected to lead to structural change in 
agriculture, away from corporate and towards individual farms (World Bank, 1995:2;  Csaki and 
Lerman, 1994:560; Sarris et al. 1999: 315-317); Mathijs et al. 1999:4-8; Swinnen, 1994:42,178). 
Also more recently, Lerman (2000:10) regards ‘individualization of former socialist agriculture as a 
valid goal, … since individual farms are the dominant organizational forms in market economies.” 
However, as early as 1994 it could be noted that “already now it is clear that the process of 
farm restructuring … is taking a course which appears to be different from the original expectations 
of many Western European observers. … It is remarkable that farm enterprises … choose to 
reorganise as whole entities, without dismantling the collective structure” (Csaki and Lerman, 1994: 
566, 573). In many Central and Eastern European countries, a considerable, and sometimes a 
majority share of agricultural land was, and still is worked by farming structures other than 
individual farms. This share is 92 % in Slovakia, 76 % in the Czech Republic, 72 % in Hungary, 48 
% in Bulgaria, 37 % in Estonia, 35 % in Romania, 33 % in Lithuania, and 5 % in Latvia and 
Albania (Swinnen and Mathijs, 1999:24; Cungu and Swinnen, 1999:607)
1. 
                                                           
1 Figures are percentages of Total Agricultural Land. The year of measurement varies between 1996 and 1998, except 
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In the empirical literature, various reasons for the limited emergence of individual farms in 
most Central and Eastern European countries have been suggested, including malfunctioning factor 
markets and credit markets, asset incompatibility, land fragmentation, contract enforcement, and 
human capital problems (e.g. Sarris et al., 1999; Cungu and Swinnen, 1999; Mathijs et al, 1999). 
The aim of this paper is to suggest another possible reason for the limited emergence of individual 
farming in the region: the presence of risk, and its differential impact on different farm structures.  
This argument, which would be complementary to the institutional issues mentioned, is based on 
the differences between individual and corporate farms with regard to the ownership-management-
implementation division of labour, the relation between profit and income, the range of economic 
activities, and the interaction between household and farm business. The impact of these features on 






The data used in this paper were collected in two surveys conducted in the Czech Republic in 1999 
by the author. These surveys were developed on the basis of interview work and a pilot study in 
Moravia (the eastern part of the Czech Republic) during 1997 and 1998
2. One survey was addressed 
to operators of individual farms, who were members of the Czech Association of Private Farmers 
(SSZ). The distribution of SSZ members over the administrative districts in the country was taken 
to be an approximation of the distribution of all Czech individual farmers
3. The survey among 
management of corporate farms in the Czech Republic was conducted in co-operation with regional 
representatives of the Czech-Moravian Union of Agricultural Co-operatives (representing co-
operative farms and farm companies with limited liability and joint-stock structure. These are the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
for Albania (1995). Note that Poland and former Yugoslavia, while geographically in the Central and Eastern European 
area, are not relevant here. In both countries (and their successor states), family farms were dominant throughout the 
communist era, and de-collectivisation in the sense defined was not an issue in the transformation (see e.g. Pryor, 1992). 
 
2 For interview findings, see Bezemer (1999) 
 
3 The precise distribution was unknown due to the rapid growth of their number during the transformation and problems 
of definition. 
 
  3successor organisations to socialist-era collective farms. Data on 193 individual farms and 69 
corporate farms were collected.  
  Since detailed technical and financial information could not be collected in the survey, 
information from the Czech Research Institute for Agricultural Economics (VUZE) was used as a 
complementary source. This data set consists of a panel of 238 individual and 172 corporate farms 
and includes information on area, product mix, labour and wages, costs and revenues, production 
efficiency and regional location. The data from the VUZE data set and the two survey data sets 




3. Risk and Farm Organisation in Transition 
 
Two observations are pertinent to the present account of why the individual farming sector remains 
limited. First, this is not so much due to the number of farms as to their size. In the case of the 
Czech Republic, in 1998 there were, according to the 'Register of Economic Subjects', 92,845 
agricultural businesses with the legal form of 'physical person' (podniky fyzickych osob), i.e. 
individual farmers. But the number of individual farmers also registered (this time in the 
'Agricultural Register') as producing food (i.e. for the market) was only 32,365 (MACR, 1999: 
TA2.1/03;TA2.1/04). Of these 32,365 farmers there is area information for 22,971: over half 
(12,208) worked less than ten hectares and only 6 % (1,425) used over a hundred hectares. Between 
them they worked 24 % of agricultural land, with an average area of 26 hectares  (MACR, 1999:TA 
2.1/05). 
  The bulk of the remaining land was occupied by 3,464 corporate farms (2,208 limited-
liability or joint-stock farm companies and 1,256 co-operative farms). Of the 2,251 corporate farms 
for which area information is available, all worked over a hundred hectares, except for a minority of 
232 farms, or about 10 %. The average area was 677 hectares for farm companies and 1,411 
hectares for co-operative farms (MACR, 1999:TA2.1/03; TA2.1/04). 
  The same pattern can be observed in most other Central and Eastern European countries (see 
Sarris et al., 1999:309 for figures). Individual farms have been established in abundance, but most 
remain of marginal size relative to corporate farms. Explaining why individual farms stay small and 
                                                           
4 Additionally, information in EBRD (1999), MACR (1994 -1999), and OECD (1995) was used to account for 
developments in productivity and for inflation. A detailed appendix describing the matching procedure is available on 
request. 
 
  4 
 
  
corporate farms stay large is an important step towards explaining present agricultural sector 
structures in Central and Eastern Europe. 
  A second observation is that Central and Eastern European agricultural markets have been 
characterised by risk in the sense of variability of farm gate output prices
5. An illustration is 
presented in table 1, where price developments during the transformation in the Czech Republic and 
the European Union are compared. Especially in the years up to 1995, price fluctuations were large. 
These two observations may lead us to consider if there are mechanisms, inherent in the structure of 
individual as compared to corporate farms, that have constituted a larger disincentive to expansion 
for individual farms. 
 
<insert table 1> 
 
The implications of individual and corporate farming under risk are best studied by a formalisation 
of the production and income characteristics of the alternative farm types. Given a utility function 
U(K,L) of the farm owner, a variable indirect utility function which is the dual of U can be defined 
as V(p,y), where p denotes a stochastic output price, y is income, K denotes the quantity of capital 
and L other factors of production used (an aggregate of land and labour). Abstracting from saving, 
utility depends on income and there is risk aversion so that Vy > 0, Vyy < 0
6. Consider the case of an 
individual-farm owner-operator. Expected total income depends directly on profit and can be 
defined as 
 
E(y)  =  E(pF)  –  c(L,K)  +  B         (1) 
F = F (L,K) 
                                                           
5 We analyse the implication of output price risk rather than fluctuations of input prices or of yields/productivity, since 
output prices appear to constitute the largest risk factor. Yet the same type of argument could be made for other risk 
sources. 
 
6 Subscripts denote derivatives, superscripts refer to goods (or notes, as here). The basic assumption of this argument is 
a link between price fluctuations and utility of the farm operator. This may not always be valid. Price variability need 
not affect utility if wealth is sufficiently high to provide a buffer, if futures markets are used to hedge price risk, or if 
forward contracting is possible (e.g. Newbery and Stiglitz, 1982:99). However, farms in Central and Eastern European 
agriculture generally operate under none of these conditions. In the case of the Czech Republic, farm financial resources 
are typically limited, and hedging or forward contracting as risk-management tools have not yet started to develop in 
agribusiness (see e.g. MACR, 1999; Csaki et al., 1999:39). 
 




where E is the expectation operator, B denotes non-stochastic, non-agricultural income, and c and F 
are the cost and production function, their values depending on prices and quantities of inputs
7. This 
basic model can be used and adapted to show that there is a set of mechanisms that causes risk to 
have a larger impact on individual farm strategy than is the case in corporate farms. 
 
Investment under Uncertainty 
As Sandmo (1971) has shown, investment under price uncertainty is smaller than under price 
certainty
8, inversely proportional to the sensitivity of the utility from income to price risk, which is 
COV(Vy,p) in the present notation. Denoting the uncertainty case by a superscript asterisk, this can 
be shown by taking first derivatives of the utility functions under certainty and uncertainty:  
 
E(Vy yK)
* = Vy yK = 0 
E(Vy yK)
* = E(Vy(pFK - p
K)
* + COV(Vy,(pFK - p
K) = Vy(pFK - p
K) = 0 
COV(Vy,p) < 0  ⇔ (pFK - p
K)
* > (pFK - p
K) = 0    
 
A conventional focus in the production-under-uncertainty literature is on risk aversion of the 
decision maker, which is most often assumed an innate personal characteristic. In the present study 
the stress is on the sensitivity of utility from income to price risk, which is controlled both by risk 
aversion and by the extent to which price fluctuations translate into income fluctuations. The main 
analytical aim of this section is to show how, in the Central and Eastern European context, this 
extent may depend on farm organisation. Specifically, we will now analyse management incentives; 
ownership structures; lump-sum transfers; and production-consumption links. 
 
Management 
Corporate farms have a functional separation between labour, management, and ownership. 
Typically, owners of a part of the corporate farm have delegated most of the formulation of farm 
strategy to the farm management, who face a different incentive structure from the individual farm 
owner. Farm management income (denoted I) is not equal to farm profit y, but usually for the larger 
                                                           
7 In keeping with accounting conventions, the farmer is here assumed to value his own labour in monetary terms. This 
assumption can be relaxed without consequences for the subsequent analyses. 
 
8 For conditions where exceptions may occur, see Newbery and Stiglitz (1982). 
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part is a fixed wage (w) and, possibly, a share (1-t) of farm profit (which is normalised to 1). The 
simplest management income function that incorporates the above features is 
 
I    =  w  +  (1-t)y           (2) 
s.t.    y = 1 
0 < t,I,w < 1 
 
Under uncertainty, the optimisation problem for the individual-farm owner or corporate-farm 
manager is to set input levels such that E(VyyK) = 0 and E(VIIK) = 0, respectively. Assuming that Vy 
= VI, i.e. that a wealth difference between the corporate farm manager and individual farm operator 
owner does not affect the utility of income
9, the above implies 
 
Proposition 1: Employment of farm managers with a (partly) fixed wage results in lower investment 
in risk exposed production than in the certainty alternative, but higher than would be the case on 
owner-operated farms. 
Proof: see Appendix 
 
Since, as we have seen, under-investment is proportional to -COV(V.p), corporate farms under-
invest less than individual farms, the difference being proportional to the fixed share of manager 
salaries t and inversely proportional to the marginal productivity of capital FK., corporate-farm 
over-investment (as compared to the individual owner-operated farm) will occur
10. Other things 
equal
11, the lower sensitivity of decision makers’ incomes to price risk in corporate farms as 
compared to individual farms is one possible reason for the fact that corporate farming continues to 
                                                           
9 Relaxing this assumption strengthens the argument if risk aversion is decreasing in wealth. 
 
10 Note that Central and Eastern European farms are frequently loss-making, so that marginal costs are larger than 
marginal revenues and  income y is negative. In such cases (p
K-pFK) is positive and COV(VyFK), COV(VI,p) still 
negative, while the same results obtain. The results suggest that both the usually completely fixed wages of 
managers and the low marginal productivity of factors of production (here: capital) in Central and Eastern 
Europe would cause the difference in investment and production to remain large. 
 
11 The ceteris paribus condition captures other variables that affect price risk exposure such as the degree of 
diversification and location. The validity of these will be considered below. 
 
  7be large-scale farming, relative to professional
12 individual farms.  
 
Multiple or Single Ownership 
Second, not only is the corporate governance structure characterised by the employment of 
management, also the farm is owned by many owners rather than one single owner. The farm 
feature of interest here is the number of owners relative to farm size. The individual farm is 
characterised as a small single-owner farm, the corporate farm as a large multiple-owner farm. 
Compare a single-owner farm of type s producing output F to a multi-owner farm of type m 
producing output kF. Expected farm income is E(y) as in (1) for owners of farm type s, but the n 
owners of type m have an income defined by 
 
Eym  = (k/n)ym + Bm          ( 3 )  
s.t. 
k,n > 1 
 
Selecting output levels such that profit is optimised means E(VyyF) = 0 for both types
13. It follows 
that 
 
Proposition 2: Multiple ownership causes corporate farm owners’ investment to increase with 
decreasing ratio of farm output level (k) to farm fragmentation (n). 
Proof: see Appendix 
 
The important observation is that, typically, k/n < 1 if Czech corporate farms in the sample are 
compared to professional individual farms (n=64 and n=184, respectively)
14. 
                                                           
12 The restriction to only professional rather than all individual farms is sensible, since other individual 
farmers typically do not market a considerable part of their produce, and to that extent are not subject to 
price risk. The present, and following arguments do not apply to such producers. Their position with regard 
to risk will be analysed below in proposition 4. 
 
13 Since the cost function is here not relevant, we consider E(Vyy
f
F) rather than E(Vyy
f
K) which gives more algebra but 
the same result. 
 
14 The average output level of corporate and individual farms in the sample was 330 and 1,5 million Czech Crowns in 
1998. The average corporate farms had a management of 5 persons and a labour force of 95 workers, of whom 80 were 





There are four types of lump sum transfers (denoted B in equation (1)) to those who decide over 
agricultural production levels (owners or managers) in corporate farms. These include subsidies; 
credit (both coming in periodical liquidity and postponement of  ‘bad’ debts repayment); revenues 
from non-agricultural production (which, if non-stochastic, can be treated as lump-sum transfers); 
and non-agricultural wage income or allowances for owners. All of these are more important in 
corporate than in individual farms, and especially in professional
15 individual farms (see e.g. Csaki 
et al., 1999 on differential access to credit and subsidies; Davis and Pearce (2000) on non-
agricultural activities; and note that most owners of corporate farms have full-time non-farm jobs). 
This leads to 
 
Proposition 3: Stable revenues from non-agricultural production, better access to credit and 
subsidies, and owners’ non-farm income are all lump-sum transfers that decrease sensitivity to risk 
and hence increase output level in corporate farms (t) relative to individual farms (i). 
Proof: see Appendix 
 
On-Farm Consumption  
The above arguments all focus on exposure to price risk. As such, they were applicable to corporate 
and to professional individual farmers who actually market most of their produce, but not directly to 
the multitude of very small farms that are worked part-time or in addition to a non-farm income or 
allowance. On these small farms a significant share of farm output is consumed by the producer, 
used as gifts, or bartered (Tritten and Sarris, 2001). The behaviour of such producers differs in 
many aspects from that of market-oriented farmers (De Janvry et al., 1991). 
As Roe and Graham-Tomasi (1986), Finkelshtain and Chalfant (1991) and Barrett (1996) 
have shown for family agriculture, home-consumption has the effect of income risk reduction. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
also members/shareholders of the farm. There were on average 245 non-worker members or shareholders. The number 
of individual farms with wage labour was negligible, with on average only 0.2 workers (though 0.7 part-time workers). 
These figures show that, on average, per-member revenue levels differ by a factor 223 (330/1.5) from those of 
professional single owners, while there are on average 325 shareholders or members in corporate farms. Thus k/n < 1 
holds on average and most often; of 64 corporate farms, only 4 had average revenues per member exceeding the 
professional individual-farm average level of revenues.  
 
15 Professional individual farmers are here defined as people who derive over 75 % of income from farming and devote 
  9Consumption of own production is equivalent to replacing part of money income from production 
with a stable, lump-sum in-kind transfer to it, valued at stable input costs. The difference with 
lump-sum transfers analysed above is that it is now endogenous, i.e. depending on output level. 
Risk reduction through own consumption of produce occurs more often on small, individual 
than on large, corporate farms, for several reasons
16. For the majority of extremely small individual 
farms, increasing farm size reduces the effect of risk reduction from home consumption. Small 
individual farmers may therefore be caught in a ‘size trap’: they face an increase in income risk 
when they expand. 
Also, very small individual farms are often worked in addition to a wage or allowance 
income that is large in comparison to professional individual farmers. Also this constitutes a 
relatively stable, non-agricultural lump-sum transfer to farming, with the effect of decreasing 
sensitivity to agricultural price risk, as shown above. Also this risk management advantage would 
decrease upon farm expansion, since total labour time is fixed on the owner-operated farm. 
The implication of this analysis is that both large, multi-owner, manager-operated farms, 
and very small subsistence-type farms can diminish price risk for their owners’ incomes, while 
larger commercial family farms cannot. In this respect, transitional agricultural may be said to have 
a three-tier rather than the commonly posed dual structure (as in Sarris et al., 1999). 
In the formal analysis, we consider here only the effect of own consumption (we have 
already seen that exogenous lump-sum transfers decrease sensitivity to risk in proposition 3). 
Compare a professional to an ‘other’, i.e. small/hobby individual farm, denoting them by 
superscripts a and b, respectively. Farms of type b market a share α of their output F and consume 
the rest. Consumed output is valued at certain price pv, and equals a stable lump-sum transfer of 
quantity B = pv(1-α)F to uncertain money income E(y)
b. If α is positive, some own consumption is 
preferred over marketing all of the output. Expected marginal utility from selling - equal to E(p) - is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
over 40 hours weekly to farming. 
16 These are, first, that the option to choose between buying and producing presumes one decision unit (the family) 
weighing both options. This is so in individual, but not in corporate farms, where decision making and co-ordination is 
more costly. Second, on wage-labour farms there are considerable transaction costs of allocating produce to workers. 
Third, the risk reduction effect is also less important for corporate farms since a considerable share of output must be 
consumed in order to effect appreciable risk reduction. Per-person consumption is limited physically, and given large 
output volumes (in relation to the number of potential consumers in the farm) there may simply not be enough 
consumers to effect a risk reduction that justifies the costs. 
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then apparently smaller than marginal utility from consumption (which is pv). Thus, income for type 
a is defined as in (1), while income for type b is defined by 
 
E(y)
b = αE(pF) – c(L,K) + pv(1-α) F         ( 4 )  
where 
0< α < 1 
E(p) < pv 
 
The implication of the above is  
 
Proposition 4: Consumption of own production and larger non-farm income shares in small 
individual farms decrease the sensitivity of income to risk and discourage farm expansion of 
smaller compared to larger individual farms. 
Proof: see Appendix 
 
Does Diversification Matter? 
We will finally consider one possible objection to the relevance of the above arguments. These all 
aim to show that operators of corporate farms are less sensitive to price risk, and therefore less 
prone to reduce output levels in response to it. Alternatively, it could be argued that corporate farms 
indeed are less risk exposed because of their larger diversification. In that case, a smaller output-
reducing response to risk would result from the farm output mix reducing actual risk exposure, not 
governance structures affection risk perception. 
However, in the sample, diversification within agriculture was not important for risk 
reduction during transformation, for two reasons. First, in the actual variety in output mix was not 
much larger in corporate than in individual farms. In order to analyse the differences over farm 
types, diversification in the sample was measured by construction of a diversification index D. By 
definition, this should increase in the number of products and decrease in the share in revenues of a 
particular product. D can then be defined as 
 
 n 




  110 < ri ,r < 1 
 
where ri is the share of revenues from product or product group i in total revenues r from n products 
or product groups. If D is calculated including separately each of 10 main products in Czech 
agriculture (n=10), its value is .74 for professional and .78 for other individual farms in the sample, 
but .84 for corporate farms, with negligible differences between corporate and co-operative farms. 
If crops and livestock are aggregated (n=2), individual farms score .45 while corporate farms score 
.50, now with small differences within both groups of farm modes. So, while corporate farms are 
indeed more diversified, the difference is not large. 
The second and most important reason why diversification was not very relevant is that, for 
diversification to effect risk reduction, there must be negative covariances between prices or price 
series of product or product groups. However, prices of the 10 main agricultural products moved 
largely synchronously during transformation (see table 2 in the next section). None of the bivariate 
Pearson correlation coefficients relating to all possible pairs of the 1989-1998 time series is 
negative and significant.  
Whilst the effect of within-agriculture diversification on risk exposure of corporate relative 
to individual farms is thus limited in the period considered, this is not true for the other type of 
diversification, i.e. in activities outside the agricultural domain. These can be composed of 
relatively stable (i.e. non-stochastic) or of fluctuating revenues, which typically move in the 
opposite direction from agricultural revenues. Hence these incomes are equivalent to lump-sum 
transfers (of non-agricultural profit) to the agricultural activities of that farm, which decreases 
sensitivity to agricultural risk (proposition 3). 
 
 
5. An Empirical Assessment 
 
 Testing the Theory 
While the mechanisms proposed above are varied, they all have one implication, namely with 
regard to the sensitivity to risk of farm operators. Corporate farms operators (be they managers or 
owners) are assumed to be less sensitive to risk than are individual farm operators, while within the 
last group operators of professional farms are expected to have a larger sensitivity of income to risk 
than do ‘other’ individual farmers, if their output is valued at market prices. 
  The test is therefore: do corporate farm managers indeed exhibit a smaller reaction to 
changes in price risk than operators of professional individual farms, and will these in turn show a 
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larger reaction than other individual farmers? Ideally, one would like to track that reaction – which 
is an adjustment of output mix- for a sample of farms over a number of years, regressing, for 
instance, price risk for a given crop on hectares planted to that crop (as in Chavas and Holt, 1990 
and Chavas et al., 1983). This ‘best practice’ approach relies on a sufficiently long time series for 
meaningful results, and the short transition period as well as the nature of the survey renders it 
unfeasible. Instead, in the present study it was considered that a lower sensitivity to risk implies, 
ceteris paribus, a higher exposure to risk. Hence a measure for risk exposure that could be applied 
to the survey data was constructed. 
 
Measuring Risk Exposure 
Price risk is commonly defined as the difference between expected and realised output prices (e.g.  
Tronstad and McNeill, 1989:631). Expected prices were defined as the average over the preceding 3 
years plus a trend (cf. Lin, 1977; Hurt and Garcia, 1982; Chavas and Holt, 1990). Deviations of 
actual from expected price developments were calculated for each of the 10 main products in Czech 
agriculture. The per-product squared deviations in per cent terms
17 were combined, in each farm 
observed in the survey, through a weighed summation. Since output price risk is studied, the 
weighting factor, for each of the 10 products, was the ratio of product revenues to total revenues. 
This share was calculated on the basis of production volumes as reported by the respondents. Thus 
the measure for price risk exposure Ry for each farm was: 
 
  i=10                              
Ry =  Σ(revi,y ⋅ riski,y) 
  
i=1                                 
where 
           j=10                              
revi,y =  ri,y / Σ(rj,y) 
              j=1 
             n=3     m=2    
riski,y =  {1  -  Σ(θn⋅pi, y-n/ pi ,y)  .  Σ(θm pi, y-m / pi ,y-m-1) }
 2 
                n=1        m=1 
                                                           
17 Price changes in per cent rather than in index points were used in order to avoid sensitivity of the risk 
measure to the base year of indexing. 
 
  13 
where 
revi,y = share in revenues of product i in year y 
ri,j,y  = revenues of product i,j in year y 
riski,y = price risk from product i in year y 
pi,y = real indexed price of product i in year y 
i = 1,2,..,j,..10 
θn, θm > 0; Σθn, Σθm = 1 
 
In words, expected prices are defined as the average over the last three years plus the trend. For a 
given year y and a given product i, the per cent deviations of actual from expected prices are 
squared. This squared deviation is product risk riski,y. The 10 product risk measures are combined, 
for each farm, in a weighted summation on the basis of product shares in total revenues, to yield 
price risk exposure Ry. Note that Ry is designed so as to capture not just general market risk (which 
is riski,y) but output price risk as experienced in each single farm; it increases with increasing 
variability in output prices, and does so more for products which are more important for total 
revenues in a farm
18. 
  We have noted that risk exposure and risk sensitivity vary inversely, ceteris paribus. The most 
important of the ‘other’ factors is history, especially for corporate farms. The production structure 
in some year in the transformation, which controls the value of Ry, may be an inheritance from the 
socialist era rather than (or in addition to) a variable at the discretion of managers and owners 
during transition. Corporate managers’ risk sensitivity and the risk reduction they effected during 
transition might have been as large as (or larger than) individual farmers’, while this need not show 
in corporate-farm production structures, and thus risk exposure in year y. 
  This possibility could be taken into account, since respondents reported their production 
structures both in 1992 (the first effective post-reform year) and at the moment of surveying in 
1998. This allows for a static comparison in risk exposure between the two years of observation 
(although it cannot reflect the response to risk experienced in the intervening years). 
  The survey data also allow for the calculation of risk exposure measures for each of the four 
types of farms in the survey. Two remarks on the farm subgroups are in order here. First, as noted, 
‘professional’ individual farmers were defined as those who derived more than 75 per cent of 
                                                           
18 Different combinations of values for the weights θn and θm - which determine how important previous prices and 
price trends are in current price expectations - were tried. The findings reported below did not qualitatively change in 
the various combinations. Therefore the unweighted average (θ1 = θ2 =.5) was used 
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money income from farming and worked at least 40 hours weekly in their farm. This information 
was, however, available for 1998 only, and it is not valid to assume that 1998 professional farmers 
were already so in 1992. Consequently R1992 is calculated without differentiation between 
professional and other individual farmers. This measure is therefore likely an over-estimation of 
individual farmers’ risk exposure, both because of the own consumption and the larger non-farm 
income of ‘other’ individual farmers. 
  Second, during the transformation, and especially after 1995, differences within the 
corporate-farming sector increased as profitable activities tended to become concentrated in the 
corporate rather than the co-operative farming mode. Often debts and activities with adverse 
prospects were left in the co-operative farm, while valuable assets and profitable farm activities 
were transferred to a (newly established) corporate farm. The co-operatives, although formally 
surviving, effectively became ‘empty
 shells’ (see Csaki et al., 1999:31,36,28). For our present 
analysis the important implication is that it were increasingly the corporate rather than the co-
operative farms that reflected the strategy preferences of corporate farm managers. The decisions on 
changes in the product mix of co-operative farms were increasingly controlled by considerations 
other than the profit motive assumed in the analysis. Since the proportion of such ‘skeleton’ farms 
in the sample is naturally unknown, all co-operative farms will be included in the analysis, but their 
characteristics in 1998 can be expected to differ significantly from those of corporate farms. In 
particular, given the relation between profitability and risk, they can be expected to operate less risk 
exposed. 
 
Calculations and Findings 
In table 2 the development of prices of the 10 food products in the Czech Republic is shown, as well 
as the risk attached to production of each product, if quantified by the suggested formula. 
 
<insert table 2> 
 
It is shown that risk values differ considerably over products, in both years. Also the risk values 
were much lower in 1998 than in 1992, reflecting the greater price stability in 1998. With regard to 
the relevance of the arguments here presented, there are two observations. First, since these 
arguments relate to marginal adjustments in response to market prices, they are likely to have 
become more relevant during the transformation, since farm strategy became increasingly 
controlled by relative prices on established markets rather than by fundamental institutional change 
related to the creation of markets. At the same time, since the arguments rely on the presence of 
  15price risk, increasing price stability during transformation implies a more modest role for these 
arguments in explaining farm size. 
  Turning from the relevance to the truth of this account, table 3 shows the values of risk exposure 
measures in 1992 and 1998 for both governance types and for their subgroups, if applicable. 
 
<insert table 3> 
 
The findings can be summarised as follows. First, both the 1992 and the 1998 risk exposure scores 
of corporate farms were, on average, higher than those of individual farms, the difference being 
statistically significant in both cases (α < 1 %). Thus the main implications of the theoretical 
argument are corroborated: corporate farms are both larger and operate more risk exposed than 
individual farms. Second, the difference had increased in 1998 compared to 1992 in relative terms, 
from about a 3:4 to a 2:3 ratio. This means that, although larger risk exposure in corporate farms 
may still have resulted from production structures inherited from the socialist era, it was not 
reduced relative to individual farm exposure levels by their managers or owners during 
transformation. This is in line with their assumed smaller sensitivity to price risk. It appears 
justifiable to attribute the persistent difference to farm organisation and its impact on risk perception 
and exposure, rather than only to history. 
  Third, within the groups of the two farm types, professional individual farms produced less risk 
exposed in 1998 than other individual farms; and co-operative farms produced less risk exposed in 
1998 than corporate farms. Although both observations are in line with expectations, the differences 
are too small to be statistically significant in this sample. This, in turn, implies that the 






In this paper an explanation for limited individual farming was offered that is theoretically tractable 
and consistent as well as empirically verifiable and corroborated by the available data. The 
                                                           
19 Production structure in agriculture is obviously controlled by location as well as governance type, but this did not 
influence the conclusions. Risk exposure measures were also calculated after aggregation of farms by types and then by 
agricultural areas which differ in natural production conditions, as defined by the Czech Agricultural Research Institute. 
In each of these regions, higher risk exposure of corporate farms was observable, in both 1992 and 1998. 
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conclusion that risk may imply a larger incentive to under-produce for individual than for corporate 
farms stands, but should be qualified in several respects. First, several theoretically distinct 
mechanisms with one joint implication were empirically lumped together. It would be important to 
know which of these is the more relevant one. Although some indication of this has been given, 
there is room for more detailed empirical work here. Second, risk perception is just one factor 
controlling output mix and levels. While regional factors and history were accounted for, this could 
be more satisfactorily done in a regression approach. In addition, factors such as price level (rather 
than variability) and institutional factors affecting farm sizes (i.e. endogenous farm growth in the 
start-up phase; changes in support programs) would merit separate attention, both theoretically and 
empirically. 
Since the conclusion of this study should be accepted with caution, there is a case for further 
research of the issue, also because of the possible implications for the effectiveness of agricultural 
policies. As better data and longer time series are becoming available n the future, this topic can be 
empirically investigated with the conventional regression approach (e.g. as in Chavas and Holt, 
1990). 
 
Risk Exposure and Survival 
This account, while attempting to explain one phenomenon, also begs several new questions. In 
particular it would be strange that, while selection of production strategies that are systematically 
and excessively risk exposed is presumable punished in developed, competitive markets, corporate 
farms (having an innate tendency to overexposure to price risk) are apparently not weeded out by 
competition in favour of the supposedly more prudent individual farmers. Several answers to this 
puzzle may present themselves to readers familiar with the Central and Eastern European setting 
(see on the following e.g. Swinnen et al, 1997; Csaki et al, 1999; Sarris et al, 1999). 
  In the transitional economies, bankruptcy is often legally complex and rather easy to 
postpone. The underdevelopment of the legal and, especially, judicial system delays the exit of 
weaker firms. A related observation is that payment discipline is often still weak. Firms frequently 
operate in a situation of interdependencies inherited from the former economic system, which 
shows in such diverse phenomena as ‘bad’ debts to banks or excessive regional specialisation in 
agribusiness. Also legal enforcement of contract obligations is problematic and time consuming. 
Moreover the allocation of subsidies and credit is not generally towards the most efficient recipient. 
But often based on other rationales, e.g. networks and relations (Grabherr and Stark, 1997). 
  These circumstances hinder the development of normalised payment practices and financial 
transparency in farms. A crucial point is that they often advantage corporate farms, which are long 
  17integrated in the economic system, more so than individual farms. Differential access to credit and 
subsidies, more ‘bad’ loans and more lenient payment practices may compensate the financial loss 
of overly risk exposed production. Such features of the transition economies may cause the  
tendency of corporate farms to stay large and operate risk exposed, to be perpetuated rather than 
punished. 
 
Changes in Individual Farm Structures 
A second question raised by the present argument and findings is that, while the main conclusion of 
this paper is that an increase in risk discourages individual farming, the sample information as well 
as official sources show that there was a surge in the establishment of individual farms in 1991-
1995 (which were high - price risk years) and hardly start-ups afterwards (when risk had decreased 
considerably). Most individual farms in the sample were established in 1990 (27), 1991 (66), 1992 
(48), or 1993 (24). In the 182 responses to the relevant survey question, only six farms were started 
after 1993. Official data show the same pattern. Between 1989 and 1994 the number of people 
working in what is classified as ‘natural person businesses’ (podniky fyzických osob) – comprising 
of mainly individual farms and practically equal to the number of businesses- rose from 2,000 to 
31,217, and their share in total agricultural land (TAL) increased from virtually nothing to 22 %. In 
the second stage of the agricultural transformation, the number of people rose slightly to 34,000 in 
1995, then fell back to 33,000 in 1996 and stabilised at 32,000 and 32,500 in 1997 and 1998; the 
share in TAL increased only slightly from 22 to 23 % (MACR 1999: TA2.2/03)
20. At first sight, this 
could be interpreted as a contradiction of the present argument. But that would be to ignore two 
issues. 
First, there are a number of differences between decisions on starting a farm and those on 
expanding or contracting farm size, notably with regard to reversibility of the decision and to 
welfare (income and lifestyle) consequences of it. The latter type of decisions is likely controlled by 
more, and more complex, factors than the former. This analysis refers exclusively to the relation 
between risk and farm size for existing farms.  
  A second point is that this is an explanation assuming established markets and attributing 
explanatory power to marginal changes in farm size in relation to marginal change in price 
variability. As such the explanation is better suited to account for the period after the institutional 
changes in the agricultural sector, i.e. the ‘second stage of the transformation’ starting in 1994-
                                                           
20 There was no series available for the number of individual farms businesses rather than people employed in it for the 
entire 1991-1998 period. In 1998 there were 32,500 people employed in 22,971 businesses, with the majority being 
single-family businesses. 
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1995. In earlier years, such adaptation processes were plausibly of marginal importance relative to 
many other factors. These factors include the more extensive individual-farm credit and subsidies 
support programs, and the initial enthusiasm for individual farming, no doubt partly based on 
ignorance regarding requirements for and hardships of family farming. In this period corporate 
farms were also forced to implement de-collectivisation procedures which implied decreasing in 
size. 
It appears that after 1994/1995, de-collectivisation in the above sense was over and there 
was a roughly stable number of individual and corporate farms. If we analyse developments in this 
second stage (rather than compare 1989-1994 to 1995-1995), the development of individual farming 






The policy implications of the suggested explanation differ from some and support other 
prescriptions implied by the conventional structure-efficiency approach (posing that, in competitive 
markets, ultimately those farm structures will emerge that are most efficient). In particular, it would 
follow that market liberalisation (in the sense of a decrease of price regulation) is not always a 
means to promote efficiency in post-socialist dual (in fact: three-tier) agricultural sectors. Market 
liberalisation proper would also imply a truly level playing field, i.e. the removal of differences in 
access to credit and subsidies, of ‘bad’ loans, and of payment arrears; and moreover the creation of 
a legal environment in which contracts are externally enforceable without excessive costs. If such a 
package of policies is applied, systematic overexposure to risk will bring its own punishment and 
the present argument becomes irrelevant. It is here that the analysis supports the consensus that 
reforms must be comprehensive, not partial in order to be effective. 
  Implementation of such ‘deep’ reforms is unfortunately a complex and long-term job, and a 
mere decrease in price regulation is often seen as a desirable first step towards a more efficient 
                                                           
21 The increase in the number of individual farms between 1995 and 1998 (from 21,156 to 22,971) was larger than the 
increase in their share in Total Agricultural Land (22 to 24 %), and the average size of individual farms in 1995-1998 
indeed decreased from 34 to 26 hectares (MACR, 1999:TA2.1/04). The increase in numbers was almost entirely due to 
an increase in the number of the very small, or ‘non-professional’ individual farms. The number of farms working 
between 10 and 50 hectares increased marginally from 7,985 to 8,102. Those in the 51-100 hectares size class decreased 
in number from 1,345 to 1,236. The number of farms working over a hundred hectares rose slightly from 1,379 to 
1,425. But the number of farms smaller than 10 hectares increased considerably, from 10, 447 to 12,208. 
  19allocation of resources. Yet in the absence of competition and effective institutions, mere price 
liberalisation may have perverse effects. Price liberalisation causes price risk to increase and 
introduces incentives for corporate farms to increase in size relative to individual farms. If corporate 
farms are less efficient than individual farms (see e.g. Mathijs et al, 1999), this implies, on average, 
an incentive to decrease efficiency on a sectoral level. 
  It may also be noted that the divergence between expectations and reality with regard to 
changes in farm structures towards a family farming sector is relevant for many transition countries, 
also outside Central and Eastern Europe (see, for instance, Prosterman et al, 1998 and OECD, 1998 
for figures on Russia). High levels of uncertainty and risk have characterised these economies, both 
in the narrow sense of price fluctuation and in the wider sense of uncertainty arising from reforms, 
from the nature (or absence) of markets, and from the functioning of the administrative system. The 






In this paper it was argued that one reason for the limited emergence of individual farming and the 
continued importance of corporate farming in Central and Eastern Europe may be the presence of 
price risk, in combination with differences between the alternative farm types. These include both 
differences in economic relations (access to credit and subsidies) and in internal farm features such 
as governance type and consumption behaviour. Given output price risk, these factors imply 
different incentives to the corporate farm manager and the individual farm operator and tend to 
facilitate a divergence in farm size. The theoretical conclusion is that individual farmers are likely 
to be more sensitive to risk and accordingly to under-produce to a larger extent than do corporate 
farm managers. 
  An empirical assessment showed that risk exposure is indeed smaller for individual 
compared to corporate farms. Although there are important qualifications to this conclusion, the 
suggestion is that consideration of risk and of governance structures may be fruitful in 
understanding structural change in agriculture during the transformation. 
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  21Appendix: Proofs 
 
Proposition 1: 
E(Vy yK) = E(VIIK) = 0 
E(Vy(pFK - p
K) =  E(VI(1-t)(pFK - p
K) = E(VI(pFK - p
K)  - t⋅E(VI(pFK - p
K) 
FKE((Vy) p  -p) =  FKE((VI) p -p) - t⋅E(VI(pFK - p
K) 
COV(Vy,p) = COV(VI,p) – (t/FK)EVI(pFK - p
K) 
Note that COV(Vy,p), COV(VI,p) < 0 and  pFK > p
K and  t>0 
⇔ COV(Vy,p) < COV(VI,p)    
 
Proposition 2: 
E(Vy yF)s = E(VyyF)m = 0 
E(Vyp)s =  E(Vy(k/n)p)m 
E(Vyp-p)s= (k/n)E(Vyp -p)m  
 (k/n) <(>) 1  ⇔ COV(Vy,p)s <(>) COV(Vy,p)m





t = 0    
∧ E(y)
t > E(y)
i   ⇔ E(Vy)
i > E(Vy)
t    
∧ var  (y)
i > var(y)
t  ⇔ COV(Vy,p)
i < COV(Vy,p)














b = α + ( pv(1-α)E(Vy)
b / E(Vy p)
b)) = α + (1-α) (pv/E(p)) 
pv/E(p) > 1  ⇔ E(Vy p -p)
a > E(Vy p-p)
b 
COV(Vy,p)
a  > COV(Vy,p)
b    
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Table 1: Food Price Indices in the European Union-12 and the Czech(o-Slovak) Republic  
price index (1990=100) 
EU-12 Czecho-Slovak/Czech  Republic 
Year 
Crops Livestock crops  livestock 
1990  100 100 100 100 
1991 107  99  58  48 
1992 98  102  109  104 
1993  99 102  112 97 
1994  100 100 119 126 
1995 109  98  142  162 
1996 109  99  159  168 
1997  106 102 154 167 
1998 110  98  160  177 
Note: Indices are based on real aggregate farm gate prices. 
Sources: OECD (1995) MACR (1998, 1999), EBRD (1999), Eurostat (1994, 1999) and author’s calculations 
 
 
Table 2: Prices and Price Risk in Czech(o-Slovak) Agriculture, 1989-1998 
indexed real farm gate product prices
1  Product 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
risk1992 risk1998 
 
Wheat  100  94  55  121 130 135 126 182 198 178  .308  .046 
Barley
2  100  90  43  98  111 121 121 153 158 162  .265  .001 
rape seed
4  100  93  41  104  99  116 118 128 141 147  .315  .001 
Oats
  100  90 38 74 84 90 85  115  119  123  .094  .004 
Rye  100  86 43 72 81 85 81  119  128  117  .064  .042 
Potatoes
3  100 121  70  132  96  129 305 197 115 186  .137  .078 
sugar  beet  100 109  73  143 123 120 148 162 148 136  .219  .017 
Milk
5  100  90 39 92 87 97  103  111  116  124  .250  .002 
beef  and  veal  100  90  41  79  74  104 118 118 115 126  .120  .007 
Pork  100  90  50  109  96  132 202 209 207 207  .292  .000 
Notes:(1) Original prices are farm gate prices in current Czech Crown per ton for all products. 
(2) Figures for oats and barley in 1997 and 1998 refer to  ‘inputs in husbandry from agriculture' , as presented in table 
ta8.1/02 in  MACR (1998). 
(3) Potato figures refer to consumption potatoes. 
(4) Rape seed figures refer to oilseeds figures in 1994-1998. 
(5) A complete series of milk prices was available for class II milk only in 1994-1998. Price developments of class I 
milk deviate only a few percents from class II. 
Sources: OECD (1995), MACR (1998, 1999)  EBRD (1999) 
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Table 3: Individual Farms Showed Less Risk Exposure Than Corporate Farms 
Farm type  value risk1992 n  Value  risk1998 n 
 
Corporate .232  64  .018  64 
Of which: corporate  .225  25  .018  26 
+                co-operative  .237  39  .017  38 
 
Individual .185  184  .012  174 
Of which: professional  n.a.  n.a.  .012  116 
                 other  n.a.  n.a.  .013  58 
n.a. = not applicable 
Sources: Table 2 sources, survey findings and author’s calculations 
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